Abstract
Introduction
Since early 1980s, there have been a growing interest in the study of the process of acquiring technological capabilities in the developing countries, particularly after the successful emergence of newly industrialised countries (NICs) in South East Asia (e.g. Kim, 1980 Kim, , 1987 Kim, , 1993 Kim, , 1996 Westphal et al., 1985; Bell and Scott-Kemmis, 1985; Lall, 1987 Lall, , 1990 Katz, 1987; Enos, 1991; Pavitt, 1993, and Hobday, 1995) . The focus was mainly on the process of capability building in relatively less complex industrial technologies.
The experience of developing countries showed the important role of imported inputs in the process of technology accumulation. However, as some developing countries such as Korea are trying to enter rapidly changing science-based sectors, with increasing technological complexity, the process of technological accumulation has become more difficult and demanding. While competence building in complex technologies requires significant foreign inputs, international technology transfers in these areas are becoming difficult, as developed countries appear to be reluctant and concerned of loosing their competitive advantage.
However, India's experience in competence building in satellite technology suggests that developing countries need significant foreign inputs to build threshold capabilities in complex
systems. It appears that without significant foreign inputs at the formative phase and some form of imported inputs at later phases, developing countries are unlikely to succeed in building capabilities in complex systems.
Satellite technology is very complex, as mostly satellites are expected to survive between six to seven years in the hostile environment of space. They involve components and systems with very high reliability. Even many developed countries do not have the capabilities to manufacture such components and systems; let alone a developing country like India. Very few countries are self-sufficient in satellite technology. However, India appears to have successfully accumulated a high level of capabilities in satellite technology, by judicially combining both the foreign imports and the local knowledge. This paper analyses how the technological learning in the area of satellite building in India occurred between the early 1970s and the late 1990s. It particularly illustrates the role of foreign and local technological input in competence building process.
First, the paper gives a brief account of the history of satellite building in India. Then, it discusses in detail the process of competence building during the formative and accumulative phases. Finally, it analyses the importance and impact of foreign imports and local knowledge in these phases.
Competence Building in the Formative Phase
The satellite programme is part of the space programme, which started in 1962. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is responsible for the programme. Vikram Sarabhai, founder of the space programme, defined the final goal as the acquisition of capabilities to build and launch geostationary communication satellites, weather and remote sensing satellites. Between 1975 and 1999, India has built 25 satellites of different kinds (see Table- 1). The satellite building activities in India can be divided into two phases, that is, the formative phase (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) and the accumulative phase (since 1986). Figure-1 illustrates the activities under these phases. India appears to have followed a step-by-step approach towards technology accumulation. A spacecraft consists of the following major sub-systems: (i) structure, (ii) thermal control system, (iii) spacecraft mechanisms, (iv) power system (v) attitude control system, (vi) attitude sensors, (vii) propulsion system (viii) telemetry, tracking and command system, and (ix) payloads. Initially, India started importing whole sub-systems. Then, it started assembling the sub-systems by importing most of the components and developing some locally. Eventually, it started to make most of the sub-systems using mostly local inputs and reducing imports to very high precision items, micro-electronic components and advanced materials. (DAE, 1967-68, p.66; 1969-70, p.70) . At the same time, India was conducting joint studies with NASA to determine the right system for telecommunications and television coverage. It also sent a team of eight engineers to the US in 1969 to conduct joint studies with General Electric and Hughes Aircraft and to gather technical data from US and Canadian sources (DAE, 1969-70, p.70) . In the late 1970s, India carried out a joint study known as the ISRO-MIT study with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the US, which focused on the optimal systems design and cost estimates of an Indian National Satellite (INSAT). 1 In the following year, ISRO initiated detailed planning for the telecommunication satellite programme and sent its engineers to NASA for training (DAE, 1970-71, p.154) .
Meanwhile, ISRO was also learning to build different kinds of payloads for sounding rocket experiments. Payloads constitute the application packages in satellites. ISRO tested the first "completely India built payload" during 1969 -70 (DAE, 1969 (DAE, 1970-71, pp. 34-35) . In the early 1970s, Indian engineers, with training in France, started developing sensors for airborne remote-sensing surveys and processing of imageries provided by NASA. ISRO also started receiving real time data from American and Canadian scientific satellites such as Solrad-9 and 10, S-66, Alouette-11 and ISIS-and II, that were orbiting over India (DAE, 1971-72, p.159) . This enhanced the knowledge of Indian scientists. While doing the studies on defining INSAT, ISRO started working on the design and fabrication of a small satellite weighing 40 kg and a bigger scientific satellite weighing 350 kg. Thus, the era of satellite building began in India.
Indian Scientific Satellite -'Aryabhata'
In 1972, the Academy of Sciences, USSR, agreed to launch a satellite built in India, cost free. 1975) . Most of the equipment needed for fabricating and testing the satellite had to be imported (Tribune, 28 May 1975) . Space qualified components that "were specifically selected from the preferred parts list of NASA" were imported from various countries (DOSa, 1972-73, pp. 26-27; Rao, 1978, p.122) . "Practically all the components like transistors and chips, used in the satellite, were obtained from abroad" (Hindustan Times, 25 May 1975) .
"The high quality tape recorders, the spin up system, the solar cells, were supplied by the Soviet Union. Instruments needed to conduct the experiments onboard were purchased from the US and elsewhere" (Tribune, 28 May 1975) . Soviet Union provided a number of subsystems and considerable technical help such assistance for conducting tests on various models of the spacecraft, and operating the ground station (Rao, 1978: 129 (Rao, 1978, p.128) .
Aryabhata also helped ISRO to build a "core team of scientific and technical personnel"
(SPACE India, October 1991-March 1992, p.17).
Satellites for Earth Observation -'Bhaskara I and II'
After Aryabhata, in 1978, the Soviet Union agreed to launch another Indian satellite, again cost free. The satellite called Bhaskara-I, for earth observation was to be built modifying the unused second flight model of Aryabhata. Thus, ISRO could cut the cost and time. The objectives behind Bhaskara-I were more ambitious. With Aryabhata, the aim was to establish the capability to design and fabricate the satellite main bus. The applications of its payload
were not considered seriously. In the case of Bhaskara-I, the immediate goal was to "obtain scientific information about meteorology, hydrology, and oceanography, using satellite based facilities to analyse the data collected from these surveys. The next step in the learning curve was to build a remote sensing satellite. Bhaskara-I provided this opportunity.
"In an ideal case, an earth observation satellite needs to be three-axis stabilised so that the sensors can point towards the earth continuously" (Joseph, 1992, p.25) . However, ISRO decided to utilise the standby model of Aryabhata that was only a spinning satellite. The
Bhaskara-I project work started in 1975. It was the first major inter-centre effort of ISRO.
What is known today as ISRO Satellite Centre (ISAC), in Bangalore, was given responsibility for the overall project. The design and development of payloads and the responsibility to generate data products were given to Space Applications Centre (SAC) at Ahmedabad. The responsibility for ground management and operations was assigned to Sriharikota (ISTRAC)
Centre. Altogether, 14 Indian and 20 Soviet agencies were involved in implementing the project. Around 400 Indian scientists were involved in the project and it took nearly 4 years to complete (Times of India, 08 June 1979; Hindustan Times, 13 June 1978) . A number of facilities for the generation of data products, processing of imageries, analysing satellite health, receiving data from satellite and testing components and subsystems were established.
The major indigenous effort was the development of the payload that comprised two TV cameras and three satellite microwave radiometers (SAMIR). Overall, about 25 per cent of the components were imported (Times of India, 9 June 1979). This included solar cells, NiCd batteries, space worthy tape recorders, and TV camera systems. SAC, Ahmedabad designed the cameras, and assembled them using imported components from France and the
US (Patriot, 24 May 1978). The television tubes were specially made and supplied by
Thompson-CSF of France (Patriot, 13 July 1979). As the company made the tubes for the first time, it was very keen to see the system successfully employed in space. Bhaskara-I was launched on 07 June 1979. It was expected to last only for 1 year but was operational for more than 2 years. After some initial problems, its TV camera's started sending pictures, which were comparable to those taken by other meteorological satellites such as Nimbus.
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The TV camera system transmitted nearly 800 images (DOSb, 1981-82, p.50) .
As with Aryabhata, Soviet assistance for Bhaskara-I was considerable, especially in carrying 
Experimental Communication Satellite --(APPLE)
To define an appropriate operational communication satellite system for India, ISRO had undertaken extensive ground experiments using foreign satellites. 5 Prof. Roy Gibson, Director General of ESA, visited ISRO when APPLE was being constructed at the Peenya Industrial Estate in Bangalore. Seeing the asbestos sheds and witnessing how the work was being done, he was not at all impressed and he expressed his doubts about ISRO's ability to meet the launch schedule. Satish Dhawan, then chairman of ISRO, assured him that it would be ready for the launch. To allay further doubts, ISRO gave a dummy block of APPLE to ESA so that Ariane could be launched if APPLE were not ready. Ironically, APPLE was completed seven months before the actual launch, and the launch was delayed by ESA's satellite, a co-passenger to APPLE (Interview with Dhawan and U.R. Rao).
facilities were set up using both indigenous and foreign equipment and components (DOSb, 1978-79, pp.53-54 ).
An important development under this project was the involvement of the industry. Because of the tight time schedule, ISRO was forced to subcontract fabrication work to industry and other R&D institutions, wherever possible. and Solid State Physical Laboratory (SSPL) and NAL also were involved (DOSb, 1980-81, p.61 ).
Various models were developed and tested both in India and abroad. The thermal model was tested at SOPMER's facility in Toulouse, France. The engineering model was tested by ESA at Les Meureause, France. The critical design review and the analysis of the major results of engineering, thermal and structural model tests were jointly undertaken by ISRO and ESA (DOSb, 1979-80, pp.74-75) . The short launch schedule forced ISRO to imports most of the items required, as indigenous development would take longer than the launch schedule. ISRO imported most of the critical components and sub systems such as momentum wheel, solar array drive, reaction control system, batteries, sensors, and transponders elements, ground check out equipment, travelling wave tube and titanium gas bottles (DOSa, 1978-79, p.9; Patriot, 23 July 1981; Financial Express, 29 July 1981) . 6 ISRO also indigenously developed certain items like momentum wheel assembly, solar array drive, deployment mechanisms, Cband antenna and C-band communication payload (DOSb, 1979-80, p.75 
Procurement of INSAT-1 Satellites from the US
With the launching of Bhaskara-II and APPLE, the experimental phase ended. In the next phase, the objective was to build two satellite systems --the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite system (IRS) and the Indian National Satellite system (INSAT), for commercial operations.
The question confronting ISRO was whether it could build them indigenously and provide them to user agencies on a continuous basis. Any discontinuity would seriously affect services like telecommunication and TV broadcasting in the country. ISRO realised that though it was confident about building operational commercial systems indigenously, it might take more time than stipulated to develop them. However, it viewed remote sensing and communications separately. After a realistic appraisal of its capabilities, It decided to build the IRS-1 series indigenously and buy the INSAT-1 series from abroad. It decided to build the INSAT-2 series indigenously. There were reasons behind these decisions. As INSATs were communications satellites, they were more complex and ISRO needed longer development time. Further, as it was a high priority area, ISRO was not willing to take any risks. In contrast, the risks involved in building IRS-1s locally were considered to be low. Because, India was already receiving data directly from foreign satellites, such as LANDSAT (NASA) and SPOT (France), which could be provided to users in case of problems with IRS-1s. 
Competence Building in the Accumulative Phase
The period beginning from the mid-1980s could be considered as the accumulative phase. By the mid-1980s, ISRO has attained threshold capability to build locally both remote sensing and communications satellites (IRS-1s and INSAT-2s), within comparable time scale, for commercial operations. However, it was still dependent on foreign countries for some critical components and materials. These satellites were more sophisticated and complex than the 9 Interview with D. V. Raju. 10 Interview with a former ISRO engineer.
older generation and they required very advanced microelectronics components and materials.
For this, India was largely dependent on the Western countries. At the same time, it was becoming increasingly difficult to import many of them because of the restrictions imposed by export controls. This appears to have forced ISRO to strategically manage the indigenous R&D to avoid dependence on foreign countries for critical items. 
Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS)
The IRS-1A project was begun in June 1982 and it took much longer to develop IRS-1A than had been expected. ISRO had to set up certain facilities like a 3-meter thermo-vacuum chamber, scene simulators, charge coupled devices (CCD) calibration set up, satellite interface simulator, and data acquisition and analysis set-up (DOSa 1985-86, p.19) . By early 1984, several major subsystems such as the reaction control system, reaction wheels, vertical sensors, horizon sensors, communication systems and vital components of the camera were developed indigenously by various ISRO centres (DOSa, 1982-83, p.12) . Subsequently, solar array drive mechanism, altitude reference system, and slip ring unit for the solar array drive assembly also were indigenously developed (DOSa, 1983-84, p.22) . These activities clearly indicate ISRO's thrust towards achieving total indigenisation in the area of spacecraft control systems. This is a critical area of satellite technology and some of the components discussed above face export controls. Therefore, it is likely that India decided to develop them indigenously to avoid export control problems.
IRS-1A's cameras involved an entirely new technology in remote sensing sensors. When ISRO started planning IRS-1A's main features, the remote sensing satellites used only opto-mechanical scanners like the Landsat-MSS and TM for multispectral imaging. In June 1983, Linear Imaging Self-scanning Sensor (LISS) using CCD in the push broom mode was flight tested on board the shuttle flight STS-7 in a German Experimental Earth Observation programme, MOMS. At the time, France was also planning to use such a camera for SPOT.
In India, a single-band CCD camera for aircraft platform was designed and flight-tested in 1980. Another sensor using a linear photo diode array was flown on its ROHINI-D1 satellite in June 1981. Using these experiments, ISRO was able to do a comparative study of the optomechanical scanner and the LISS and decided to use solid state CCD cameras in IRS-IA. The experience gained from using the LANDSAT data (NASA) helped ISRO in deciding to employ the LISS payloads with two different spatial resolutions (DOSa, 1983-84, pp.30-32) .
IRS-1A was launched on 17 March 1988 by a Soviet launcher. The satellite was designed to operate for three years only, but it continued to operate long after its expected life. The performances of its cameras were "very good, producing very high quality imaging" and there was "no deterioration of performance even after the design life of three years" (Joseph, 1992, p.35) . A number of new technologies incorporated in the satellite such as large area solar panel, reaction wheels and gyroscopes, hydrazine-based reaction control system, S-band and X-band communication systems, a variety of solar, earth and stars sensors, "have performed to specification much beyond the expected life of the satellite" (DOSb, 1993-94, p.18 ). The quality of imagery received from IRS-1A was comparable to LANDSAT-D (Patriot, 16 March 1988) . 12 Unlike the cases of Aryabhata, Bhaskara-I and II, the Soviet technical assistance in IRS-1A was "equal to zero," except for the launch services on a commercial basis (Patriot, 16 March 1988) . Most of the technology involved was indigenous and some critical components and subsystems, such as CCD and the imaging lenses, were imported (DOSb, 1984-85, p.22) Following IRS-1A, IRS-1B and IRS-1C were built and launched in 1991 and 1995 respectively. IRS-1B was identical to IRS-1A with some improvements. IRS-1C is considered as "one of the best remote sensing satellite systems available compared to any other civilian operational remote sensing satellite system" (Joseph, 1992, pp.36-37) . 
INSAT-2 Satellites
The composite elements, various alloys and alloy forging (DOSb, 1997-98, p.46-54) . However, ISRO was also dependent on imports for a number of items. They included radiation hardened integrated circuits (ICs), solar cells for solar arrays, sensors, infra-red and visible channel detectors and highly polished beryllium mirrors for VHRR, cells for nickel-cadmium batteries, thermal blankets to maintain the satellite temperature regime, light-weight, high precision and high reliability parts, such as propellant tanks for ABM and mirco-thrusters, micro-processor for attitude and orbit control system, and microwave transistors (The Hindu, 01 July 1992; India Today, 30 September 1992, p.145; DOSa, 1986-87, p.15) . 
Exports
Since mid-1990s, India has been selling remote sensing data to a number of countries through Space Imaging-EOSAT, an American company. India also started exporting to the US and European companies a small number of sub-systems and components like shaft assemblies, pressure transducers, fill and drain valves, solar wing actuators and hinge assemblies, C-band receive and transmit filter assemblies, magnetic torquer rods, reaction wheel assemblies with drive control electronics, solar array drive assembly with electronics and software packages.
India has established a Telemtry Control and Ranging (TCR) station for World Space Inc., the US, to provide in-orbit support for its satellite systems. It also provided technical and consultancy services to Korea for its spacecraft mission control system, and telemetry, tracking and command services to PanAmsat and Systems Loral, the US (DOSa, 1997-98, p.81; 1998-99, pp.84-85; DOSb, 1997-98, p.48) .
Role of Foreign Imports and Indigenous Efforts in Technology Accumulation
The main objective of India's satellite programme was to achieve capability to build commercial scale satellites for remote sensing and communications. For this, it required to accumulate skills in the areas of design, various analysis, fabrication, testing, integration and spacecraft control. It also had to establish various ground facilities. Despite following 'selfreliance' policy, from the beginning, India considered foreign collaboration was necessary to learn these skills from advanced countries. Dhawan, former chairman of ISRO argued:
"simply saying nationalistically that we will do it ourselves, we will land in all kinds of problems…industrially we are a small country. We cannot afford…" to do every thing indigenously. 14 At the same time Indian scientists were fully aware that they had to make strong and sustained efforts to develop locally whatever technologies they could by employing available resources. In the early 1970s, India's capability in all aspects of satellite technology was nearly zero. By the late 1990s, it has acquired capabilities to build 3-tonne class satellites and started exporting satellite data products, spacecraft sub-systems and components in a small scale. India reached this position by judiciously combining local effort with foreign collaboration. This is illustrated by the Figure-2 . This paper clearly showed that foreign collaboration appears to have played a very significant role during the formative phase of competence building, that is, until the mid-1980s (see Table- 2). In the area of remote sensing satellites the Soviet Union was the foreign actor 14 Interview with Dhawan.
while, in the case of communications satellite, it was the US and the European countries, particularly France. Under the Aryabhata, Bhaskara-I and Bhaskara-II projects, India learned how to design, fabricate and test a spinning low-earth orbit satellite. Under the APPLE and the INSAT-1 projects, India learned a number of techniques involved in building and operating geo-stationary, 3-axis stabilised communication satellites. During this period, it appears that India was able to import almost anything needed for its programme without hindrance. At the same time, it was clearly evident that India was making strong efforts indigenously to develop all the components it could by using existing knowledge and
capabilities.
This paper also demonstrated the predominant role of local efforts during the accumulative phase, that is, since the mid-1980s. It is clear that India's dependence on foreign imports has significantly declined during the IRS-1 and INSAT-2 projects (see Table- 3). The developments under these projects suggest that due to export controls India started planning and managing its indigenous efforts in a manner so as to reduce dependence on foreign countries for most critical items. During this period, India appears to have accumulated a high level of capabilities in the areas of design, fabrication, testing, integration and spacecraft control. It has also established world class facilities for spacecraft simulation, testing, and various analyses. Overall, India appears to have achieved threshold capabilities in satellite building by the mid-1980s. Therefore, it is likely that the role of foreign technological inputs in competence building in future may decline further.
The major factor, which helped India to gradually reduce foreign technical assistance and import appears to be the emergence of a technological partnership among ISRO, other R&D institutions, universities, and industry (see Figure-3 ISRO has fostered a network of supplier firms through applied R&D, proto-type development, technology transfer, training, sharing of information and facilities, and quality management systems. ISRO and in some cases other R&D organisations provided the 'know-how' to firms, which either was developed locally or absorbed from a foreign source. The firms were involved in development and engineering (D&E), R&D related to production problems, and final production. The 'know-why' and the basic research remained under the domain of ISRO, other R&D organisations and academic institutions. By the late 1990s, ISRO has transferred 231 technologies to the firms and over 500 small, medium, and large firms, from both public and private sectors, were involved in the space programme (DOSa, 1998-99, p.82) . Some of the large firms have established separate space divisions to meet ISRO's demands.
Simultaneously, ISRO also developed linkages with universities through a programme known as Sponsored Research (RESPOND) and brought in other public R&D institutions.
Gradually, it has helped to forge linkages among firms and between various institutions. , 1997-98, p.81, 1998-99, pp. 84-85) .
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Further, it is also likely that with increasing complexity of its next generation satellite projects, India will continue to depend on foreign imports for high precision and micro-electronic components, materials and advanced equipment for ground facilities. This suggests that competence building in complex systems in a developing country would continue to depend on considerable foreign technological inputs, even after it reached threshold level. Also, India's experience suggests that for entering international market in the area of complex systems, which is very competitive, a developing country may have to forge foreign collaborations.
Conclusions
This 
Phases of Capability Building

1970
Very Little Capability
Local Efforts: Design and fabrication of main bus, assembling sub-systems, QC, equipment for setting up ground facilities, designing and assembling payloads, and started a number of technology development projects.
Foreign Imports: Sub-systems, large number of components, equipment for ground facilities,technical assistance for design studies, testing, integration, and failure analysis, project management and documentation skills.
By late-1990s
Exports: Started selling satellite data,Leasing satellite transponders, Exporting sub-systems and components Imports: Micro-electronic components, advanced materials and equipment for ground facilities
Until early-1980s
Since mid-1980s
Foreign Imports: Precision engineering and micro-electronic components, piece parts, advanced materials, and advanced equipment for ground facilities.
Local Efforts: Capability at sub-system and to some extent component level most equipment for setting up ground facilities, design and fabrication of payloads, nearly total capability in testing, integration, QC, project management and emergence of a strong network of R&D and academic institutions, and supplier firms. 
Academic and
